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Abstract
This paper studies the identication and estimation of a basic model of technology adoption
using specically collected information on subjective beliefs and expectations to identify key model
parameters. We discuss identication with both non-parametrically and parametrically specied
utility as well as parametric and semi-parametric specications for unobserved heterogeneity. We
propose parametric and semi-parametric estimation methods to recover underlying preferences and
use the model to study the adoption of Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs) among poor households in
rural India. We carry out counterfactual exercises to examine the eects of price and belief changes
on net ownership decisions. The results suggest that net purchase decisions are relatively insensitive
to changes from current prices and beliefs. The methods proposes here should have applicability to
other discrete choice settings with non-linear indices.
JEL: I1,I3
Key words: Malaria, Expectations, Bednets, Identication, Median Restrictions
We thank seminar participants at UC Berkeley, Yale, UC Riverside, USC, UVA and the World Bank for useful
comments. We also thank Han Hong, Michael Luca, Luigi Pistaferri, Priya Satia, John Strauss and Frank Wolak for
helpful discussions. We are deeply indebted to Bharat Integrated Social Welfare Agency for facilitating access to villages
covered by their micronance network; to Lakshmi Krishnan and Benita Sarah Matthew for their superb work in supervising
the project; and to the whole team of survey monitors in Sambalpur for their tireless eorts. We are also very grateful to
Annie Du
o and the Center for Micro Finance for invaluable help in making this study possible. The authors gratefully
acknowledge nancial support from the Center for Micro Finance (Chennai, India) and the Stanford Presidential Fund for
Innovation in International Studies. We are solely responsible for all errors and omissions. Aprajit Mahajan, Dept. of
Economics, Stanford University, 579 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305, amahajan@stanford.edu. Alessandro Tarozzi, Dept of
Economics, Duke University, Social Sciences Building, PO Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708, taroz@econ.duke.edu. Joanne
Yoong, The RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street Arlington, VA 22202, jyoong@rand.org. Brian Blackburn,
Stanford University School of Medicine, Division of Infectious Diseases and Geographic Medicine. 300 Pasteur Dr, Room
S-101 MC 5107, Stanford, CA 94305, blackburn@stanford.edu.1 Introduction
Economists and public health researchers have found that relatively inexpensive welfare-improving tech-
nologies are often not adopted by poor households.1 Insecticide treated nets (ITNs) are an exemplary
case. Research has demonstrated ITNs to be an extremely eective malaria prevention method, par-
ticularly among pregnant women and children.2 However,the purchase and use of ITNs remains low in
many malaria-prone areas (Webster et al. 2005, Monasch et al. 2004).
The public health literature suggests many factors contributing to low adoption rates, with cost
often being the most cited. Poor households may have lower or simply insucient willingness to pay
for ITNs (Guyatt et al. 2002ab, Onwujekwe et al. 2000, 2004). Even households that are willing to pay
may not be able to do so if they lack the cash at hand and are also unable to borrow to purchase ITNs.
Subjective preferences and expectations about malaria and ITNs have also been proposed as expla-
nations for low net takeup. A basic diculty of trying to analyze ITN-related decision-making using
observed choices (or any purchase decision more generally) is that such choices may be consistent with
many combinations of expectations and preferences. In particular, familiarity with malaria and bed-
nets as well as cultural factors, preferences, and perceptions are important considerations (Onwujekwe
et al. 2000, Alaii et al. 2003). For example, individuals may weigh against cost other benets of nets,
such as better sleep, and ignore the usefulness of ITNs in malaria prevention. In many instances, the
purchase decision for ITNs is primarily made based on the nuisance level of mosquitoes, rather than
any desire to prevent malaria (Louis et al. 1992, Van Bortel et al. 1996, Klein et al. 1995). Studies
also show that individuals who understand the connection between mosquitoes and malaria may also
attribute the disease to other additional factors, making it dicult to convince them to adopt ITNs as
a control measure (Agyepong 1992, Ahorlu et al. 1997, Agyepong and Manderson 1999, Hill et al. 2003
and Adongo et al. 2005).
Disentangling the dierent reasons for non-adoption has important policy implications. For instance,
policy recommendations would be quite dierent if cost played a more important role than beliefs. To the
extent that standard expected utility theory is relevant, prices and beliefs (along with other components
of the choice problem) aect behavior in non-separable and non-linear ways so that separating the
eects of the two in non-experimental data will require explicitly modeling household expectations
about the risk of contracting malaria as part of the decision process. Such a choice model will usually
yield estimating equations (or likelihoods) that are non-linear in parameters and whose identication
properties are typically unknown.
This paper is a rst attempt at providing both a careful identication analysis of such models as well
as the estimation of one such model using data from rural Orissa (India). Our data is unusual in that
it contains detailed information on household level beliefs about the likelihood of malaria under various
scenarios. We posit a simple discrete choice model that incorporates beliefs, costs and preferences in a
standard choice framework. We then study identication of key model parameters while allowing for
unobserved heterogenity in preferences by adopting a semi-parametric framework. 3 Finally, we carry
1See Du
o et al. (2006) for a review of these arguments in a more general context.
2See e.g the extensive survey in Lengeler (2004).
3The results here are closest to Matzkin (1991) who studies the problem of non-parametric identication of subutility
functions when the distribution of the error terms is parametrically specied (see also Matzkin (1992)). See also Chiappori
2out a series of counterfactual exercises to provide a rst order answer to some of the questions raised
above. The results suggest that net purchase decisions are relatively insensitive to changes from current
prices and beliefs.
The identication results proposed here also relevant for other discrete choice settings with non-linear
index function specications. In particular, we show identication results for preference parameters
(such as risk aversion parameters) that enter the index function non-linearly while at the same time
placing relatively few restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences. Concretely,
we show identication results for household varying constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences
in the presence of cluster xed eects while imposing only a conditional median restriction on the
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. Non-linear index functions and unobservable heterogeneity
are present in a variety of economic models so that the identication results presented here should be
applicable to those contexts as well.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature overview. The nature of
the data plays an important role in the theoretical formulation of the model and Section 3 provides an
overview of the study location and design and a rst description of the data. Section 4 develops a basic
static model of technology adoption. Section 5 discusses alternative formulations for preferences and
Section 6 discusses possible methods for modeling the unobserved components of preferences. Sections
7 and 8 provide identication results and estimation of the identied model is carried out in Section 9.
Section 10 carries out a set of counter-factual exercises based on the estimated model and the conclusions
follow.
2 Literature Overview
Recent work by economists has used historical evidence to document the signicant improvements in
literacy, education and income arising from malaria eradication (Bleakley 2007, Cutler et al. 2007).
In the absence of a vaccine, prophylaxis and treatment remain the only two avenues for dealing with
malaria. Multiple studies have linked ITN use to reductions in malaria infection as well as related
morbidity and mortality.4 In Orissa, the eld setting for this project, ITN use was associated with
vector reduction and a 50-60% decline in malaria prevalence in Malkangiri district (Sahu et al. 2003)
and Sundargarh District (Yadav et al. 2000). The best universally-accepted evidence of ITN ecacy
comes from a large medical trial conducted in Western Kenya where sucient free ITNs were distributed
in randomly-chosen villages to allow all persons to sleep under a net, reducing clinical malaria and
moderate-severe anemia by 60% in children under ve.5
However, despite such evidence, ITN coverage remains woefully low. Estimates for all areas at risk
in India indicate only 20% coverage (Korenromp 2005). Many public health specialists attribute low
adoption rates to costs as well as beliefs and information broadly construed. Adongo et al. (2005) state
that no study examining the competing explanations does so carefully enough to disentangle the unique
et al. (2009) which also studies the problem of inferring risk preferences from discrete choices.
4See for instance Beach et al. (1993); Stich et al. (1994); Abdulla et al. (2001); Leenstra et al. (2003); ter Kuile et al.
(2003)a,b.
5See Alaii et al. (2003); Leenstra et al. (2003); Hawley et al. (2003)ab, ter Kuile et al. (2003)a,b and other articles in
the same issue.
3contributions of cost, lack of knowledge about malaria and the number of alternative attributions. This
gap in the literature suggests the need for a model of consumer choice that incorporates perceptions
about malaria and its costs, but also importantly, beliefs about the relative ecacy of ITNs in preventing
malaria.
The standard approach to integrating expectations into structural models of consumer choice under
uncertainty relies on making assumptions about individual information as well as the process of ex-
pectations formation. For example, Gonul and Srinivasan (1996) estimate a dynamic structural model
of diaper purchase that takes into account endogenously determined expectations of future coupons.
Erdem et al. (2003), Sun et al. (2003) and Hendel and Nevo (2006) also estimate structural models of pur-
chase decisions that include consumers' price expectations, while Erdem et al. (2005)'s model of learning
about computers and consumer purchase choices incorporates expectations of both price and quality.
However, inferring expectations from realizations may be problematic, as misspecication of either the
information set or the expectations formation process may lead to incorrect estimates (Manski 2004).
Eliciting subjective probability distributions, however, allows researchers to replace these assumptions
with data. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of surveys have successfully elicited probabilistic
expectations from their respondents.6 In the developing country context, subjective probabilities have
been elicited to study HIV risk (Delavande and Kohler 2007), weather forecasts and livestock and crop
planting decisions (Luseno et al. 2003, Gin e et al. 2007, Lybbert et al. 2007) and migration decisions
(McKenzie et al. 2007).7
More economists have begun using subjective expectations to explain behavioral choices as such data
becomes available. Nyarko and Schotter (2002) use stated beliefs about opponents' behavior to predict
behavior in a series of experimental games. They nd that choice models estimated with stated beliefs
outperform those estimated with standard models of belief formation. Lochner (2007) links expectations
to criminal behavior and nds that youth with a low perceived probability of arrest are signicantly
more likely to commit crimes. Hurd et al. (2004) shows that individuals with low subjective survival
probabilities retire earlier. Delavande (2008) measures probabilistic expectations about contraceptive
methods from young women, and combines them with data on actual contraception choice to estimate
a structural model of birth control choice. Heterogeneity in beliefs is used to identify respondents'
preference parameters for each pregnancy.
Our work is also related to recent studies that analyze behavioral issues surrounding ITN use and
cost variation. Cohen and Dupas (2008) use an experimental intervention in Kenya to demonstrate that
both selection into ITN adoption and ITN usage conditional on adoption are not signicantly aected
by variations in the cost of the net (including a price of zero). Homann (2008) uses experimental data
to document dierences in the intra-household allocation of free versus purchased ITNs in Uganda.
6See, for example Dominitz (1998) for a discussion of the Survey of Economic Expectations and Hurd and McGarry
(1995) and Hurd et al. (2004) for an analysis of the predictive value of subjective survival probabilities collected during
the U.S. Health and Retirement Survey.
7See Delavande et al. (2009) for a recent survey.
43 Location and Data
With a population of 37 million (2001 Census), Orissa accounts for only about four percent of the total
Indian population, but it has one quarter of India's annual malaria cases, 44 percent of P. falciparum
malaria (the most severe form) and 18 percent of malaria deaths (NVBDCP 2008).8 The Orissa Human
Development Report cites malaria as the \number one public health problem" in the state (Government
of Orissa 2004). The state Department of Health and Family Welfare reported 366,000 cases of malaria
in 2007, 87% of which were P. falciparum (NVBDCP 2008).9 The 1998-99 round of the National Family
and Health Survey (NFHS) revealed self-reported malaria incidence rates between 8.5% and 17.2% in
our study districts.
The data used in this paper are part of a household survey completed in May-June 2007 in rural
Orissa, India. The survey covered 150 villages in the ve district of Bargarh, Balangir, Kandhamal,
Keonjhar and Sambalpur.10 Data were collected for a sample of 1947 households, with a total of 10,641
members. Households were sampled from 150 villages selected from a list of 878 villages where BISWA, a
local micro-lender, had an established presence at the end of 2006.11 We treated each of the ve districts
as a separate stratum and selected 33 villages from Balangir, 48 from Bargarh, 30 from Keonjhar, 9
from Phulbani and 30 from Sambalpur. Within each selected village we selected 15 households from lists
of borrowers provided by BISWA.12 A household-level questionnaire administered to adult respondents
included a comprehensive survey of household demographic, socioeconomic and health characteristics.
Importantly, the instrument also includes a detailed section on household beliefs and practices related to
malaria and bednets. A subset of the household was tested for malaria infection using rapid diagnostic
blood tests. Malaria prevalence (as well as hemoglobin levels) were recorded for all children under ve
(U5) and their mothers, all pregnant women and a random sample of working-age adults (15 to 60-year
old).13
Table 1 includes selected summary statistics. The 1947 households in the sample have 5.5 members
on average. The vast majority are Hindu (with only 6 percent of Christians in Sambalpur). Overall,
scheduled castes and tribes and \other backward castes" account for more than 90 percent of the
study population. Mean per capita expenditure|calculated by summing reports for 18 dierent item
8These gures likely understate the actual burden of malaria in India, because they are largely based on active and
passive case detection which monitor certain geographical areas and population groups disproportionately (Dutta 2000).
Such monitoring systems often miss individuals who are parasitemic but asymptomatic because of acquired partial immu-
nity (Vinetz and Gilman 2002). For a recent, broad overview of the malaria burden throughout India see also Kumar et al.
(2007).
9In the same year, 214 malaria deaths were reported. Malaria mortality rates in India are much lower than in many
malarious African countries, due to the relatively better vector-control and health care system in India (Alles et al. 1998).
10The study blocks were chosen because the corresponding district medical ocers did not plan free ITN disbursals in
those areas.
11The reason for this choice is that the data are part of the baseline survey for a randomized controlled trial carried out
in collaboration with BISWA.
12The sampling scheme generates dierent probability of selection for households from dierent villages. Sampling
weights were computed as the inverse of such probabilities and have to be used as in
ation factors for the calculation of
statistics representative of the study population.
13Individuals were tested for malaria with the Binax Now
 R malaria RDT. This antigen-based test provides accurate
diagnosis for current malaria infection (Moody 2002).
5categories|is Rs 655, which is approximately twice as large as the poverty line in rural Orissa in
2004-05.14 The mean number of bednets per head is close to 0.3, but very few of these are treated
with insecticide, so that the overall mean number of ITNs per head is only 0.04. This is despite the
high malaria incidence: 55 percent of households report at least one case of malaria in the six months
preceding the interview. The results of the biomarkers, which measure prevalence at the time of the
test (and only in rare cases can detect past infections more than one-two month old) conrm high
prevalence, with 12 percent of blood samples testing positive, almost always with falciparum infection.
Overall, the fraction of tested individuals with anemia (that is, hemoglobin levels below 10g/dl) is 23
percent for males and 35 percent among women. Note also that the survey was completed in late spring,
that is, during the dry season, when malaria rates drop. That malaria prevalence may be higher during
the rainy summer is also conrmed by reports about bednet use. While 13 percent of individuals slept
under bednets the night immediately before the interview, a much higher fraction (55 percent) report
regularly sleeping under a net during times of peak mosquito activity.
Respondents' beliefs about the eectiveness of ITNs in malaria protection are an important element
in our purchase decision model. Accurate measurement of beliefs is complicated by the low schooling
level of most of our respondents and their unfamiliarity with the concept of probability. To elicit
subjective probabilities of events we asked respondents to hold up a number of ngers increasing in
the perceived likelihood that the event will happen. Hypothetical examples were rst introduced by
the interviewer to make sure that the respondent understood the rationale. We estimate the subjective
probabilities by dividing the number of ngers held by ten.15 The survey instrument included questions
about the probability for an adult, a child under the age of six (U6) or a pregnant woman (PW) of
contracting malaria in the next year. Crucially, separate beliefs were elicited for hypothetical scenarios
where the individuals make regular use of an ITN, an untreated net or no net at all.16
Overall, only two individuals did not respond to the corresponding questions. Reassuringly, very few
respondents report that the probability of getting malaria is higher if one sleeps regularly under a net
than if one doesn't (19 for U6, 23 for adults and 21 for PW). The vast majority of respondents (1797
for U6, 1775 for adults and 1771 for PW) report probabilities lower in the former than in the latter
case, while equal probabilities are also relatively rare (130 for U6, 148 for adults and 154 for PW), and
almost always limited to answers equal to .50 or 1. Figure 1 reports histograms of the elicited beliefs.
The means and standard deviations of the beliefs are reported in Table 2.
The three graphs at the top in Figure 1 show the distribution of the beliefs for individuals who sleep
regularly under a treated bednet. The graphs in the middle and bottom rows show the distributions
for individuals who sleep under an untreated net or who do not use nets at all. A few clear conclusions
emerge. First, there is remarkably little dierence in the reported beliefs for individuals belonging to
14The line was Rs 326, which is close to one US dollar per day per person using PPP conversion rates (Government of
India 2007).
15Note that we do not attempt to measure ranges of probability, so that our data do not allow to identify the degree of
uncertainty around the reports.
16For instance, one question asked: \imagine rst that your household [or a household like yours] does not own or use
a bed net. In your opinion, and on a scale of 0-10, how likely do you think it is that a child under 6 that does not sleep
under a bed net will contract malaria in the next 1 year?" Questions for dierent demographic groups and bednet use
were asked using analogous wording.
6dierent demographic categories. This is somewhat surprising because adults, who are likely to have
developed partial immunity, are less likely to develop symptoms. If perceptions about malaria risk
depend on the observing symptoms, one could have expected to nd higher perceived risk for children
than for adults. Second, both bednets and re-treatment with insecticide appear to be widely recognized
as very eective at reducing malaria risk. Third, the elicited beliefs are strongly concentrated over the
focal gures 0, 5 and 10. About three quarters of respondents believe that if nets are not used one
will certainly get malaria, and approximately the same fraction believes that regular use of treated nets
will virtually wipe out all risk. According to about half of respondents, there is instead a 50 percent
chance of developing malaria if an untreated net is used. On the other hand, there remains a degree of
variation in the beliefs which can be exploited in the structural estimation that will follow in Section 9.
4 A Basic Model of Net Adoption
In principle, the decision to purchase an ITN is most appropriately modeled as a dynamic problem
with net purchase occurring in the rst period and realized malaria status in the second period. This
is particularly true when analyzing retreatment decisions. However, given the cross-sectional nature
of the data, we consider a static optimization problem focusing on the issue of net ownership. In this
framework, therefore, both net purchase and malaria status are revealed in the same period so we
abstract away from time discounting issues for now.
To x ideas, consider a static individual optimization problem for an agent with state dependent
utility who needs to decide whether to purchase a net. Let v(c;b;s;z) denote the agent's utility function
where c denotes consumption of all other goods, b is a binary variable equal to one if the agent purchases
a net, s is also a binary random variable equal to m (\malaria") if the agent contracts malaria and h
(\healthy") otherwise. Finally, z is a vector of exogenous variables such as prices, income and other
attributes. The components of z are allowed to depend upon malaria status s, but that dependence is
suppressed in the notation. Throughout the paper we use bold fonts to indicate (column) vectors and
matrices, while \ 0 " denote transpose.
Assuming a unique interior solution for consumption, the agent will purchase a net if
E[v(c(b;s;z);b;s;z) j b = 1]  E[v(c(b;s;z);b;s;z) j b = 0]
where c (b;s;z) denotes planned optimal consumption given purchase status b, malaria status s and
exogenous variables z. Expectations are taken with respect to malaria status s, and we assume that the
purchase decision is taken based on subjective beliefs about the probability of falling sick conditional on
the purchase decision b. Comparing indirect utilities in this fashion forms the basis of the estimation
procedure and also provides the rationale for the variables we include.
To allow for unobserved heterogeneity across agents, we partition z as (~ x;(0);(1)) where ~ x are
observed exogenous variables and (b) is an unobserved component of preferences that depends upon
net ownership status. For instance,  may capture the agent's comfort level with a net. To simplify
the problem further, we assume that  enters additively in the utility representation as
v(c;b;s;z) = ubs(c; ~ x) + (b)q(~ x): (1)
7Allowing (b) to enter non-additively will complicate identication considerably. We do, however, allow
for purchase decisions to depend upon interactions between observables and unobservables through the
function q(~ x). Using the specications above, and suppressing dependence upon (c; ~ x) for simplicity,
the agent's net purchase decision is given by
b = IfE(u1s   u0s j b = 0) + (u1h   u1m) + ((1)   (0))q  0g (2)
where   P(s = m j b = 0) and      P(s = m j b = 1) so that  is the perceived reduction
in the probability of contracting malaria when using a net. The econometrician observes the vector
(b;c(b;s); ~ x;;) where consumption is elicited from households for each possible net purchase and
malaria status combination.17 To clarify the exposition that follows, we rewrite the optimal purchase
decision as an explicit function of preferences (captured by u())
b = Ifg (u();x) + q (x)  0g; (3)
where x is redened to equal the vector (c;;; ~ x),  = (1) (0) and g() is dened by a comparison
with (2) above. Note that with this redenition q is allowed to be a function of all the components of
x. This will be useful when accounting for econometric issues with measurement and is discussed in
subsequent sections. The object of interest is the utility function u(). The extent to which we can
learn about preferences depends critically upon the assumptions we are willing to make about u() and
the unobservable component of choice q (x).
In what follows, we will explore the limits to knowledge of u() under two alternative assumptions on
the unobservable component q (x): We will rst assume a particular parametric form for this term
and impose strong independence restrictions between the observable and unobservable determinants
of choice. Second, we will adopt a much weaker assumption that allows for dependence between the
errors and observed covariates. The rst assumption has the advantage that estimation and inference
proceed along well established lines (conditional upon identication) whereas the second assumption is
much more robust to the presence of dependencies between observable and unobservable determinants
of choice.
Mirroring the discussion above, we also explore identication under alternative assumptions on u()
for a given set of assumptions on the unobservable components of preferences. We start by specifying a
parametric form for preferences and proving a point identication result. We next explore identication
when the utility function is not specied parametrically.
17In practice, this is done by eliciting purchase costs and malaria costs from survey respondents and subtracting these
from stated consumption. A more correct (and non-parametric) approach would require positing
c(b;s) =
X
b2f0;1g;s2fm;hg
Cbs:
Then, the Cbs would be unknown parameters of interest and the econometrician would only observe stated consumption
in one state of the world. This addition to the model would signicantly complicate estimation and so is ignored here.
We note though that the identication results stated in the subsequent sections would still hold with this addition to the
model.
85 Utility Specications
5.1 Non-Parametric Utility Specication
Rewriting (3) to show the dependence of preferences upon covariates explicitly we obtain
b = IfE(u1s (x)   u0s (x) j b = 0) +  (u1h (x)   u1m (x)) + q(x)  0g:
Next, we dene the quantities
1 (x)  u1m (x)   u0m (x)
2 (x)  u1h (x)   u0h (x) (4)
3 (x)  u1h (x)   u1m (x)
which are the fundamental objects of interest in the non-parametric setting and can be interpreted intu-
itively. The quantity 1 (x) measures the impact of bednet use on observables-dependent utility among
agents with malaria, 2 (x) measures the corresponding impact among healthy individuals and 3 (x)
denotes the dierence in observables-dependent utility among ITN users with and without malaria. The
non-parametric model can then be written as
b = If1(x) + (1   )2(x) + 3(x) + q(x)  0g: (5)
Identication in this model therefore refers to identication of the () functions. Note that with a
non-parametric specication we cannot directly identify the level utilities ubs() since the () functions
do not uniquely identify them without further normalizations.
5.2 Parametric Utility Specication
The non-parametric specication outlines the limits of what can be learned without placing assumptions
on the utility function. However, in principle, much more can be learned if one is willing to impose
more structure on the utility function. In this section, we show that restricting attention to a class of
parametric utility functions enables us to study whether the entire utility function itself (and not just
the dierentials identied above) can be identied given the data.
Understanding household attitudes towards risk and the relationship between these attitudes and
the household's net purchase decision allows us to test whether the marginal utility of consumption is
state dependent or whether the household's coecient of risk aversion is state dependent. In a strictly
non-parametric setting such an analysis is not possible since, as we saw above and formally show below,
the utility function itself is not directly identied. In such a case it is a fortiori not possible to identify
a household's attitudes towards risk.18 For this purpose, we therefore consider a convenient parametric
representation of preferences that belong to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) family. We
begin by positing a variation on this class that accounts for household level covariates and which is
18If the utility function were directly identied and were suciently dierentiable one could directly construct estimates
of risk aversion based on calculating the second derivative of the utility function with respect to consumption.
9
exible in how net ownership aects utility. We specify the utility function in (1) as
v(c;b;s;xa;xb;xm) = (0 + 1b)c(b;s)1 
(xa;s;) + b2 + bx0
b3
+ I(s = m)4 + x0
m5I(s = m) + 6bIfs = mg + (b)q (x); (6)
where xa, xb and xm are subsets of the vectors of observable covariates x, (0;:::;6;) are parameters
and where we impose that the risk aversion coecient 
 2 (0;1) for now. The restriction to the unit
interval is easily relaxed to allow 
 to belong to any open interval (0;c) for a known constant c.19
The risk-aversion parameter 
 is allowed to depend upon exogenous agent characteristics xa as
well as malaria status (which implies state dependent utility). The dependence upon malaria status
is intended to capture the notion that households may be more (less) risk averse when they are sick
(healthy). Note that in principle, the optimal consumption decision also depends directly upon x, but
we ignore this dependence in the subsequent analysis for tractability considerations. Besides appearing
in the unobserved component (b), net ownership aects utility directly (through 2 and, for malarious
individuals, 6), through consumption c (via the budget constraint) as well as through the vector xb
(via the coecient vector 3). The latter captures the heterogeneity of preferences over net ownership.
It seems reasonable that households vary in their attitudes towards net ownership and to the extent
that this variation is captured by the observables xb, we can account for it directly. Analogously, the
coecient 4 capture the direct eect of malaria upon utility while the parameter vector 5 captures the
heterogeneity across households in their utility losses from malaria. Households are likely to have diverse
coping mechanisms for dealing with illness in general and the variables in xm are intended to capture
the resultant utility dierentials across households. The interaction terms between net ownership and
malaria status (6) captures a possible notion of regret where households may derive lower utility from
net ownership if they do succumb to malaria while owning a net. Alternatively, the utility of a bednet
could be higher for malarious individuals because of the perceived reduction in the risk of spreading the
disease.
Given this specication of preferences, the latent index b can be written as
b = Ifg (x;;) + q (x)  0g; (7)
where   (1)   (0),  = (0;1;2;0
3;4;0
5;6) and
g (x;;)  2 + x0
b3   4   x0
m5 + 6(   )
+ (0 + 1)h1 (;;c;xa;)   0h0 (;c;xa;)
h1 (;;c;xa;)  (1    + )c(1;h)
1 
(xa;h;) + (   )c(1;m)
1 
(xa;m;)
h0 (;c;xa;)  (1   )c(0;h)
1 
(xa;h;) + c(0;m)
1 
(xa;m;) :
The parameter vector of interest is (;). To ensure that the risk aversion parameter is bounded on
the unit interval, we use the following parameterization

 (xa;s;) =
ex0
a1+0Ifs=mg
1 + ex0
a1+0Ifs=mg; (8)
where   (0
1;0)0.
19Note that since 
 is between 0 and 1 by assumption we do not need to divide the utility function by (1  
) as is done
in unrestricted specications of the CRRA function.
106 Error Specications
We specify two alternative models for the error term in (3). The rst specication supposes that
q (x) = 1 and imposes a parametric assumption on  that includes an additive village xed eect.
This allows us to develop a parametric non-linear maximum likelihood procedure that, conditional upon
identication, has standard statistical properties (that is, parametric convergence rates and limiting
normal distributions) that are easy to analyze. This model, however, has the weakness that household
level unobserved heterogeneity (as captured in the last term of (3)) must be independent of observable
heterogeneity.
The second model overcomes this weakness by making no assumptions on the form of q (x) or any
parametric assumption on  beyond assuming that it is median independent of the covariates x. This
model allows for interactions between the observed and unobserved components of preferences as well
as for the presence of village level xed eects. The disadvantage of this specication is that the
statistical properties of the estimator are not straightforward. Conditional upon identication, we
conjecture (based on the results of Kim and Pollard 1990) that the estimator is cube root consistent
with a non-normal limiting distribution. We use subsampling to conduct inference and allow for the
possibility that the parameters are only partially identied. Taken together, the results from these two
strategies will provide a robust picture of net adoption determinants in the data.
6.1 Parametric Error Specication
In this subsection we assume that unobserved household level heterogeneity is independent of the ob-
served determinants of choice with a known distribution. We work with the standard logistic model
since it is analytically tractable when dealing with xed eects (in fact, it is perhaps the only tractable
error distribution in dealing with xed eects in binary choice, see Chamberlain 1993). We assume that
the researcher observes a random sample on (bch;xch), where recall that the covariates x also include
total expenditure, and where the index h 2 1;:::;Hc denotes a household within cluster (village) c, and
Hc is the number of households sampled within the cluster.
ASSUMPTION 1. The unobserved term chq (xch) = fc + ch where fc is unobserved village level
heterogeneity and conditional on (xch;fc) the household specic error terms (1c;:::;Hc) are i.i.d. with
standard logistic distribution.
Under Assumption 1, the model therefore assumes that unobserved heterogeneity consists of two
additively separable components one of which () is independent of fx;fg with parametrically specied
distribution. The other component (f) is allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with observables but
is restricted to be constant across households within a cluster. Indexing by households and clusters,
equation (3) is then given by
b
ch = Ifg (u();xch) + fc + ch  0g (9)
and given the i.i.d. assumption, the probability of purchase is given by
P

bch = 1

 fxch;fcg
Hc
h=1 ;u(:)

=
exp(g(u(:);xch) + f)
1 + exp(g(u(:);xch) + f)
; (10)
11where we make explicit that the likelihood is a function of the choice-dependent utility. The non-
standard aspects of the model are contained in the index function g(). In the non-parametric case, the
index function contains the () functions described in (4)|which are the objects of interest|whereas
in the parametric case the function contains the nite dimensional parameters of interest (;). The
non-linear and non-standard nature of g () means that we must rst develop identication results
for the model given by (10) before we can proceed to estimation. As a rst step, we write down
the likelihood function. Using the standard conditioning argument to eliminate the xed eect (see
Chamberlain 1984), the likelihood of a particular sequence of net ownership decisions conditional on
the total number of adoption decisions within cluster c is given by
P
 
bc = b
 
 

Hc X
h=1
bch =  bc;fxch;fcg
Hc
h=1 ;u()
!
=
exp
PHc
h=1 g (u();xch)bch

P
a2A(Hc; bc) exp
PHc
h=1 g (u();xch)ah

where A(Hc; bc) is a set consisting of all sequences of binary variables fahgHc
h=1 such that
PHc
h=1 ah =  bc:
The likelihood function is then
C
c=1
exp
PHc
h=1 g (u();xch)bch

P
a2A(Hc;
PHc
h=1 bch) exp
PHc
h=1 g (u();xch)ah
; (11)
where C denotes the number of clusters in the sample.
6.2 Conditional Median Error Specication
The second estimation strategy begins by making far weaker assumptions on the error term  and the
function q (x). Similar errors specications have been used frequently following the introduction of the
Maximum Score estimator in Manski (1975). This is important for at least four distinct reasons. First,
given the observational nature of the data, there is no compelling reason to believe that the observed
and the unobserved determinants of net ownership decisions do not interact with each other. One way
of capturing such interactions is via the existence of a non-constant q() function. Second, self-reported
beliefs may be measured with error for various reasons and incorporating this into the model is important
since they play an important role in identication. Third, the parameters in (7) might reasonably be
understood as random coecients. Finally, there may be no compelling reason to believe that the errors
follow the parametric form specied above and at the very least we would like to examine the sensitivity
of our conclusions to the error specication. In all of these cases, implementing an estimation procedure
based on the conditional logit model in (11) would lead to inconsistent inference.
We therefore begin by describing the following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 2. The error term ch satises
median
 
chjfxchgH
h=1

= 0 (12)
This assumption allows for a non-constant function q (x) in (3) as well as allowing for other forms
of dependencies between the unobserved heterogeneity and the observed covariates. In Appendix B we
outline formal models for measurement error and random coecients that can be placed within this
12framework. The weakness of the zero conditional median assumption, however, is that it is very dicult
to recover all the parameters of interest in the index function. In particular, we will have to make scale
normalizations that will imply that only part of the vector  is identied. In addition, given the
non-linear nature of the index function we will have to make stronger assumptions on the support of
the consumption variable for identication.
We also consider a direct weakening of the conditional logit specication to the maximum score xed
eects specication.
ASSUMPTION 3. The unobserved term in (3) can be decomposed as chq(xch) = fc+ch, where fc
and ch represent unobserved heterogeneity at the village and household level respectively. Conditional
on (fxchgC
h=1;fc), the random variable ch has the same distribution for all h = 1;:::;H and has support
over the entire real line.
This assumption weakens the joint logit parametric assumption made previously but like the con-
ditional logit allows for endogeneity. However, note that we do not place any restrictions on the joint
distribution (beyond imposing that they have the same marginals) so that we also allow for general
correlation in the error terms across households. This is unlike the conditional logit which imposes
strong independence assumptions. Insofar as these correlations are an important issue with clustered
data, it is important to account for them. The maximum score xed eect model provides one method
for doing so in addition to making minimal assumptions on the nature of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Relative to Assumption 2 this assumption is weaker in that it allows for a xed eect but it does not
allow for the direct interaction between household level observables and unobservables we allow in As-
sumption 2. All the caveats with respect to support conditions and normalizations hold here a fortiori.
We discuss identication of the parametric utility model under Assumption 3 but do not do so for the
non-parametric case since the proof is very similar to the case where Assumption 2 holds.
7 Identication with Parametric Errors
7.1 Identication with Non-Parametric Utility
If there were no observable covariates (i.e. no (xa;xb;c)) in the utility functions, then the model would
reduce to one that is linear in parameters and standard linear conditional logit identication conditions
would suce. However, once observable covariates enter the indirect utilities, stronger assumptions are
required. To simplify exposition, we rst focus on the case where there are only two households per
cluster. We begin by assumping that beliefs|which are observable covariates in our data set|remain
stochastic even after conditioning on other covariates. In what follows, for given vectors A and B,
B  A, we use \AnB" to denote the elements of A that do not belong to B. All proofs are included
in Appendix A.
ASSUMPTION 4. The distribution of ch conditional on (xchnch;xch0) contains at least two points
of support for almost every conditioning value.
ASSUMPTION 5. The distribution of ch conditional on (xchnch;xch0) contains at least two points
of support for almost every conditioning value.
13In our context, assumptions 4 and 5 are intuitively sensible, because the perceived protective power
of bednets likely depends on unobservable characteristics such as access to information about malaria or
mosquito density. If one could perfectly predict beliefs using observables, there would be no identifying
variation for the parameters of interest. In our data, OLS regressions of beliefs upon observables (not
reported here) are encouraging in the sense that observables do not predict beliefs well with the R-
squared of the regressions being very small. The following lemma shows that such variation in beliefs
is required for identication regardless of the utility's functional form.
Lemma 1. Consider the model given by (5) with the errors satisfying Assumption (1). Then, under
Assumptions 4 and 5 the utility dierential functions j() for j = 1;2;3 are identied.
The proof uses variation in beliefs across households to identify the model by utilizing dierencing
arguments. Note that although the dierentials themselves are identied, the individual components of
the dierentials are not.
7.2 Identication With Parametric Utility
We now describe identication results assuming a parametric utility function as in (7). For simplicity
we consider the case where there are 2 households in the cluster, but the argument holds for larger
cluster sizes as well. Suppose that the model is not identied. Then, there exist parameters (~ ;~ t) such
that the likelihood is identical under the true values (;t) and under (~ ;~ t) so that for any b
P
 
bc = b
 

 
2 X
h=1
bch =  b;fxchg
2
h=1 ;;t
!
= P
 
bc = b
 
 

2 X
h=1
bch =  b;fxchg
2
h=1 ; ~ ;~ t
!
:
We rst note that the parameter 2 is not identied since it is an intercept term that does not vary across
households within a cluster. Next, identication of  requires further restrictions on the  parameters.
This is formalized in the next assumption.
ASSUMPTION 6. The parameters 0 and 1 satisfy 0 + 1 6= 0.
This assumption will be satised automatically as long as the marginal utility of consumption for
the agent is strictly positive. The necessity of this assumption follows from examining the form of the
g(:) function and noting that if 0 + 1 were equal to zero, then the function h1(:) which is used for
identication would not enter the likelihood. More generally, if both 0 and 0 + 1 were equal to
zero, then  would not enter the likelihood at all and hence would not be identied. However, since the
parameters can be interpretated as marginal utilities of consumption, it is reasonable to assume that
they do not equal zero. In fact, in some of the estimation exercises we will set this sum equal to one so
that this assumption will be automatically satised.
ASSUMPTION 7. The consumption variable cch(1;m) conditional on (xc1;xc2)ncch(1;m) is contin-
uously distributed over some range.
The continuity assumption is required to enable dierentiation of the h1() function with respect to
consumption, an important step in showing identication.20 Assumption 7 is relatively undemanding,
20Showing identication with discrete support for consumption requires more work and is not pursued here.
14because it implies, for instance, that consumption cannot be perfectly predicted using covariates for all
households in the cluster and that the residual variation after conditioning is continuously distributed.
It is the residual continuous variation in consumption that is central for identication. In our data,
OLS regressions of consumption on household observables indicate that while some of the demographic
variables (household size and education) are important predictors of consumption, the R-squared from
these regressions is quite low, approximately :10.
ASSUMPTION 8. At the true value of ; the random vector
(xb;c1   xb;c2;h1 (xc1;)   h1 (xc2;);h0 (xc1;)   h0 (xc2;))
and the vector xa;ch have a non-singular second moment matrix.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the model is given by (7) with the errors satisfying Assumption (1) and that
Assumptions 4-8 hold. Then, the parameters 0;1;0
3;4;0
5;6;) in model (7) are identied.
The proof relies on using the support conditions to respectively take dierences of the likelihood
function and then take second order derivatives. The second moment assumption is then nally used to
ensure that  is identied. Conditional upon identication, the large sample properties of the estimator
follow from standard results in the literature (for instance Theorem 3.3. in Newey and McFadden
1994) and we can conclude that the estimator converges at the parametric rate and has a limiting
normal distribution with the limiting variance matrix equal to the negative of the inverse of the Fisher
Information matrix.
7.2.1 Monte Carlo Results
To assess the practical validity of the identication and large sample results for the non-linear index
conditional logit model, we present the results from a series of Monte Carlo experiments. The exper-
iments are designed to illustrate that the parameters are well estimated in nite samples and that the
parametric rate of convergence holds.
The model is given by
b
ch = Ifg (xch;;) + fc + ch  0g; (13)
where  = (0;1;3;4;5;6) and (suppressing the data subscripts)
g (x;;)  3xb   4   5xm + 6(   )
+ (0 + 1)h1 (;;c;xa;)   0h0 (;c;xa;)
h1 (;;c;xa;)  (1    + )c(1;h)
1 
(xa;h;) + (   )c(1;m)
1 
(xa;m;)
h0 (;c;xa;)  (1   )c(0;h)
1 
(xa;h;) + c(0;m)
1 
(xa;m;) :
Beliefs (;4) are each i.i.d. Beta(1;1) random variables, the (xb;xm) are independent random variables
with a discrete uniform distribution on [0;5] and a Bernoulli distribution with p = :6 respectively. State
contingent consumption is given by
c(b;s) = c   :05cbb   :25css + fc
15where (c;cb;cs;fc) are independent and log-normally distributed. The function

(xch;a;sch;) =
exp(1xch;a   2sch)
1 + exp(1xch;a   0sch)
where (0;1) = (0; :5). The errors ch have a logit distribution. Note that the consumption variable is
correlated with the village xed eect fc so that a xed-eect formulation is necessary. The parameter
vector of interest is then (0;1;0;1;3;4;5;6) = ( :5;0;1;0;3;1;1; 1). In order to carry out
the estimation, we use a simplication noted inArellano and Honore (2001) that constructs the objec-
tive function by carrying out pairwise comparisons of observations (within cluster) and is much faster
to compute than the MLE. The resulting estimator is an M-estimator and its asymptotic properties
therefore also follow from standard results (see e.g. Newey and McFadden (1994)). The simulations
are carried out for four sample sizes (150, 200, 300 and 600) and the results are reported in Table 4.
The estimator is well behaved for sample sizes relevant for our empirical application with means and
medians both close to the true values. Finally, the approximate halving of standard errors with the
doubling of sample size provides encouraging evidence that the parametric rate of convergence holds.
8 Identication with Median Restrictions
8.1 Identication with Non-Parametric Utility
Identication in the non-parametric utility case with median restrictions is quite weak in the sense
that we are only able to recover one potential utility dierential of interest and that too is sensitive to
normalization. However, for completeness we record the argument. Recall from (5) that the model is
given by
b = If1 + (1   2) + 3 +   0g;
where we have suppressed for simplicity the household-specic subscripts and the dependence of the
dierentials from the covariates x. As is usual in models with median restrictions, location and scale
normalizations are required since they determine the relationship between the identied parameters.21
One possible location normalization is to set 1 = 0, which is equivalent to assuming that in the
state of the world where the agent experiences malaria, no utility is derived from net ownership. One
possible scale normalization is to set 3 = 1. This normalizes the marginal utility from avoiding malaria
(when the household owns a net) to being positive and equal to 1. These are by no means the only
normalizations one could choose of course but have the advantage of being simple to impose. With this
normalizations, the only remaining unidentied parameter is the dierential (1   2)
ASSUMPTION 9. For every xn(;) there exists an  > 0 and an open set N such that Pxn(;) ( 2 N) >
0 and for all  2 N, the distribution of  (1   2)+ (conditional upon xn(;)) has positive prob-
ability density over [ ;] (i.e. an interval containing zero).
Lemma 3. Consider the model given by (5) and suppose that Assumption 9 holds. Then the parameter
1   2 is identied.
21See Horowitz (1998) for a clear explanation on the need for such normalizations.
16The result is straightforward, since eectively, conditional upon xn(;) the model is a linear index
model and standard identication conditions apply. However, these conditions (captured in Assumption
9) place strong restrictions on the support of  and its ability to vary suciently freely conditional upon
the remaining covariates in x.22 Given the restrictive nature of these assumption, it seems worthwhile
to relax the non-parametric utility specication. A parametric specication, although clearly relying on
functional form assumptions, will allow us to exploit additional variation in other covariates to achieve
identication and so require less stringent conditions.
8.2 Identication with Parametric Utility
We begin rst by strengthening Assumption 7 to
ASSUMPTION 10. At the true parameter value (;), the index function g(x;;) conditional on
s(;;xnc(1;m)) has strictly positive density over an interval containing zero, where
s(;;xnc(0;m))
=

1


1h1 (xa;c(1;h);c(1;m);)   (1   )c(0;h)1 
(xa;h;) + 3xb
 1
1 
(xa;m;)
(14)
This is clearly a very strong assumption, but some version of this is required for point identication
in the maximum score (see for instance Horowitz (1998) for a textbook discussion on identication issues
for the maximum score in the linear index case). As the proof will show, this is a key assumption in
showing identication. To allow some degree of robustness against the failure of this assumption, we
will also implement estimation methods that allow for the possibility that the model is only partially
identied. Next, we need a stronger version of Assumption 7 for the current model.
ASSUMPTION 11. There exists a variable in xnc(1;m) that is continuously distributed over some
interval conditional on all the other variables in xnc(1;m).
Similarly, we need to replace Assumption 8 with the following:
ASSUMPTION 12. At the true value of (;), the random vector (xb;h1(x;)) has a non-singular
second moment matrix. The vector xa has a non-singular second moment matrix.
Assumption 12 performs a role analogous to Assumption 8 in Lemma 2. In particular, it is used to
argue that if  is identied, then the coecients in  are also identied. Finally, we require a scale
normalization, which is necessary given the weak assumptions on the error terms.
ASSUMPTION 13. The parameter vector 0 = 1.
Setting 0 = 1 normalizes the utility level in the \no net ownership" state of the world relative to
which utility comparisons will be made (alternative normalizations are discussed in the appendix). We
can now state the point-identication result for the maximum score estimator
Lemma 4. Consider the model given by (3) and Assumption (2). Then under Assumptions 10-13 the
parameters (1;3) and  are identied.
22Note, however, that we do not require that this support be all of the real line.
17The model in this section enables more 
exibility than the parametric error model described in
Section 7 in at least two distinct ways. First, unobserved heterogeneity is allowed to interact with
observables in determining net purchase. This is important because there seems to be no a priori
reason to rule these out and indeed such interactions are likely important given that we only observe a
subset of household characteristics. Second, the model makes no parametric assumption on the nature
of the unobserved heterogeneity which is also important given that we know very little about these
unobserved household characteristics. However, the added 
exibility comes at a cost. First, not all
the parameters of interest are identied. Second, the estimates of the identied parameters converge
at a rate slower than the usual parametric rate and the limiting distribution is non-standard, making
inference non-trivial. Finally, the assumptions for point identication are quite strong and may not
hold in our particular data set. To overcome the last criticism, we implement estimation methods that
are robust to the failure of point-identication.
8.2.1 Maximum Score Fixed Eect Identication
We next discuss identication of the parametric model under Assumption 3. This assumption allows
for household observables to be correlated with unobserved village level variables and also allows error
terms across households to be correlated with each other. We state results assuming two households per
cluster but the reasoning extends straightforwardly (in a pairwise sense) to clusters with more than two
households. In what follows it is convenient to dene wc = (xc1;xc2) and by cch(b;m) we denote the
consumption level for household h, given bednet purchase decision b and malaria status m. We begin
with an appropriate strengthening of Assumption 10.
ASSUMPTION 14. At the true parameter value (;), the function g(xc1;;) g(xc2;;) con-
ditional on ~ s(;;wcncc2(0;m)) has strictly positive density over an interval containing zero, where
~ s(;;wcncc2(0;m)) 

 
1
2

 x0  + 1h1 ()   h1;0 () + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(xa;c2;m;)
 1
1 
(xa;c2;m;)
The quantities ( x;  ;h1 ();h1;0 ();
sh ()) are dened in Appendix A. As discussed in the pre-
vious subsection, this is a very strong assumption but is key in showing point identication. Next, we
need a stronger version of Assumption 11.
ASSUMPTION 15. There exist two variables in wcncc2(0;m) which are continuously distributed over
some open interval conditional on all the other variables.
In the model, the variables cc2(0;h) and cc1(0;m) are presumed to satisfy this requirement. Similarly,
we need to replace Assumption 12 with the following:
ASSUMPTION 16. At the true vector (;) the random vector ( x;h1 ()) has a non-singular
second moment matrix. The vector xa has a non-singular second moment matrix.
Assumption 16 performs a role analogous to Assumption 8 in Lemma 2. In particular, it is used
to argue that  is identied and, as a consequence, that certain coecients in  are also identied.
Finally, we require a scale normalization, which is necessary given the weak assumptions on the error
terms. We can now state the point-identication result for the maximum score xed eects estimator
with non-linear index function.
18Lemma 5. Consider the model given by Assumption (3) and equation (7). Then under Assumptions
13-16 the parameters (1;0
3;4;0
5;6) and  are identied.
8.2.2 Monte Carlo Results
We carry out a small set of Monte Carlo simulations to assess the practical performance of the maximum
score estimator in small samples. We use genetic algorithms to maximize the objective function. The
model is the same as was estimated in Section 7.2.1 with the exception that 0 is normalized to be
1. The results in Table 5 illustrate that the parameters are estimable in small samples, although the
performance seems worse than in the parametric case. Finally, looking at standard deviations across
sample sizes indicates that the standard parametric rate of convergence does not hold.
9 Estimation
9.1 Parametric Errors and Preferences
We rst discuss estimation of the model given by the parametric utility framework in (7). In this
specication, the risk aversion coecient is a function of xa via the index function (8). We assume
that xa includes household size, age and education of the household head and the number of children
under the age of ve (U5). In addition, we assume that xb includes a binary variable equal to one if
the respondent thinks that more than 50% of households in the village sleep regularly under a bednet.
This interaction between net ownership and household perceptions of community level net ownership
captures (in an admittedly ad hoc manner) the potential interdependence between household utility
and the perceived behavior of other households.23 The presence of this variable is motivated both by
eld observations as well as results from reduced form regressions that suggested that net ownership is
aected by the perceptions of other households' behavior. Since we use a xed eect assumption on
the error term, we directly control for actual net usage levels in the village. As a result, any measured
eect of the perceptions variable will be net of actual usage levels. Finally, we assume that xm includes
household size and the number of U5, so that we allow the disutility from malaria to vary by household
size as well as by the fraction of young children in the household. This allows us to capture further
potential heterogeneity in the impact of malaria across households (beyond that captured in the risk
aversion parameter). Finally, the parameter 6 allows for the interaction between malaria status and
net ownership to aect utility.
The model is estimated using the (conditional) maximum likelihood (11) using gradient-based meth-
ods and the results are displayed in Table 6. We rst estimate the parameters  that characterize the
coecient of relative risk aversion. All the variables included in xa are positively associated with the
level of risk aversion. In particular, households with more young children are more risk averse than
households with fewer children. This suggests that the reduced form positive correlation between net
ownership and young children arises partly because households with young children are more risk averse.
In addition, older and more educated household heads are more risk averse which again provides an
23We do not, however, model the implied simultaneity across agent choices. Doing so would greatly complicate the
model and require an assumption of rational expectations to nd solutions.
19economic rationale for the positive correlation we observe in reduced form between these variables and
net ownership. The point estimate for malaria status is positive, implying that utility is state dependent
and households with malarious individuals exhibit more risk aversion towards consumption lotteries in
the malaria state of the world (so that marginal utility of consumption is higher). However, the esti-
mate is not signicant at conventional levels. As expected, malaria decreases utility (4 < 0), but the
coecient is not signicant. In addition, there is evidence that malaria has heterogeneous impact across
households with the elements of 5 negative and jointly statistically signicant. The results suggest
that malaria decreases utility more in larger households as well as households with more young children.
This is consistent with the ndings about households risk aversion. We turn next to the coecient 3
that captures the heterogeneity across households in the utility derived from net ownership. We see that
perceptions of village level ownership are important in that the direct utility derived from net ownership
is signicantly higher for households believing that more than half of the village owns a net. Since we
control for village level xed eects in the analysis, it is not actual ownership that is directly driving
these results but rather the perception that most other households own a net. This result suggests
that perceptions of group-level behavior directly aect utility and thus in
uence individual decision-
making.24 As discussed earlier, a fully general model that incorporates the strategic inter-dependence
of all agent purchase decisions would be intractable to estimate and so we leave that inter-dependence
un-modeled. Also, since we directly account for malaria related beliefs in the analysis, we already allow
for any interdependence across household decisions arising from common information.
10 Counterfactual Exercises
We next propose several manipulations of the model's exogenous variables and study their eect on net
uptake. There is, however, an important methodological impediment to this analysis. In conventional
binary choice models, one would carry out counterfactuals by examining changes in choice probabil-
ities (see, for instance, Delavande 2008). However, in a xed eects model, the choice probabilities
P(bch = 1jxch;fc) are not identied. Further assumptions, typically on the conditional distribution
fcjxch, are required to identify them. Such assumptions are not attractive since they inevitably place
considerable structure on the xed eect, an object on which one would like to place as little struc-
ture as possible. As an alternative to such ad-hoc assumptions, we propose a method for evaluating
policy changes based on a bounding analysis. Specically, let fg (xch; ^ ; ^ )gh;c denote the estimate of
the observable component of the index functions (9) for all households in the sample (evaluated at the
household specic value xch. Consider a manipulation of xch to x0
ch and denote the associated index
functions by fg (x0
ch; ^ ; ^ )gh;c. Next, identify all households who do not purchase a net and for whom
g (xch; ^ ; ^ ) < 0 < g
 
x0
ch; ^ ; ^ 

: (15)
24Unlike standard models of social interactions, utility here does not depend upon a linear functional of the (perceived)
group level distribution of usage. The variable used is equal to one whenever the household thinks that more that half of
the village owns nets. This is a non-linear (though still smooth) functional of the distribution of household beliefs about
village net usage. The information was recorded in this fashion because eldwork suggested that households were more
comfortable with this wording rather than the standard question eliciting probabilities directly. The usual xed-point
solution concepts in standard models are not directly applicable here since they rely heavily on the linearity assumption.
20In words, these are households that, in the absence of the unobserved component in (9), would change
their bednet ownership decision from non-purchase to purchase when the covariates change from xch to
x0
ch. These households provide therefore an upper bound on the possible eect of the policy intervention
net uptake, because, in reality, the unobserved component of utility will likely lead only some of them
to modify their purchase decision. If a household were to purchase a net under the new policy regime,
then it must be the case that the unobserved component of the index, that is, fc + ch, satises the
following condition:
fc + ch 2
 
 g(x0
ch; ^ ; ^ ); g(xch; ^ ; ^ )

: (16)
Counting all households satisfying the inequality (15) as \switchers" makes the implicit assumption
that for all of them (16) holds which in general need not be true. This exercise then provides us with
an upper bound on the possible eects of the policy intervention.
10.1 Evaluating the eects of Price Changes
A major issue in the public policy debate on net provision is net prices. Several global institutions
have called for largely subsidized or free net provision to poor households (see the introduction). In our
sample, the mean price paid for a net on the open market was about 80 Rupees.25 In the rst set of
counterfactual exercises we study the eect of a 50% reduction in net prices on uptake. We model the
price reduction as the increase in non-bednet expenditure c(b;s) allowed by the price reduction, leaving
total outlay unchanged. We present the results in Table 7 and show that net uptake is minimally
eected by a price change. A 50% decline in the price paid for a net leads to a maximum of four
households in the sample switching their purchase decision from 0 to 1. These results are robust
to alternate measures of consumption, alternate specications of the demographic controls as well as
changes in the extent of the price drop. The results suggest that, in this sample and conditional on the
model being correctly specied, price changes will have little eect on uptake. Our analysis is limited,
however, to estimating price sensitivity at positive values. We cannot estimate the price elasticity at
zero price since the model assumed strictly positive prices and nearly all the sample households paid a
positive price for their nets.
10.2 Evaluating the eects of Changes in Beliefs
The other major component of malaria eradication programs has been raising awareness of malaria and
of the benets of using bednets. We next evaluate the eect of interventions that exogenously alter
beliefs both about the ecacy of bednets and of community bednet use. We rst evaluate the eect of
an intervention that exogenously increases households' perceptions on the ecacy of bednets by 50%.
This means that on average a household believes that the regular use of a net will reduce the likelihood
of malaria over a malaria season by 80%. In this case, our estimates indicate that at most 23 households
(only about 1%) would switch their purchase decisions based on these revised beliefs.
Our empirical analysis showed that household beliefs regarding village level net ownership in
uenced
household utility from net purchase. We therefore evaluate the eect of a change in such perceptions
25Net costs are a relatively low fraction of expenditures (total monthly household expenditures are about 3600 Rupees
and the corresponding per capita gure is about 700 Rupees).
21such that 90% of respondents believe that more than half the village owns nets. This change leads ve
percent of households to alter their purchase decisions.
In sum, the results from the counterfactual exercises suggest that price reduction and increased
perceived protection will have limited impact on net uptake rates. These conclusions are not unexpected
given the general failure of such programs to improve net take up in practice. There is some evidence of
social interaction eects so that there may be a strong feedback eect between individual and village level
net ownership. These results, however, depend upon model specication as well as the strong assumption
that the interventions will not directly alter the structure of preferences (that is, the parameters (;))
themselves. Also, our model assumes that beliefs about bednet ecacy and community bednet use are
exogenously given, but belief formation is more likely the result of cognitive processes which should
ideally be modeled explicitly.
10.3 Estimation with Median Restrictions
Section 6.2 outlined four distinct reasons why a median restriction on the error term could be a useful
an improvement on the previous model. In addition, it would be of interest to estimate the maximum
score model as a robustness check on the stability of our counterfactual exercises. To this end, we
re-estimate the model with parametric utility under the set of assumptions required for Lemma 4. We
need to make standard location and scale normalizations and we achieve them by setting 1 = 0 and
0 = 1. The coecients across the two specications are then not directly comparable because of these
normalizations. However, it is possible to compare the signs of the coecients as well as carry out
counterfactual exercises using the maximum score coecients subject to the normalizations. Because
the objective function for the maximum score is not everywhere dierentiable, standard gradient-based
optimization algorithms cannot be used and estimation was carried out using genetic algorithms.26
Abrevaya and Huang (2005) show that the bootstrap is inconsistent for the maximum score, so we
used subsampling procedures to generate condence intervals. The results for the point estimates are
displayed in Table 8 and for the counterfactual exercises in Table 9. With the exception of ^ 51 (which
turns from negative and signicant at the 10% level to positive and not signicant) the signs of the
estimated parameters that enter the index linearly (^ ) are the same for both estimation methods. The
parameters that enter the index non-linearly (^ ) do not agree in sign with the parametric case in three
instances but, in each of these cases, they are very imprecisely estimated and we cannot reject the null
that they are equal to zero at conventional levels. The results from the counterfactual exercises are
also broadly in line with those from the parametric case, indicating that uptake responses to changes in
prices and beliefs are modest at best. Using experimental data from Kenya, Cohen and Dupas (2008)
nd document large drops in uptake when cost-sharing is introduced. Our analysis,however, is not
suited to estimate the price elasticity at a price of zero since the model assumes strictly positive prices.
26We also experimented with simulated annealing algorithms.
2211 Conclusions
This paper develops a simple static model of net purchase decisions using specically collected data on
subjective beliefs about the protective power of bednets against malaria. We study conditions for iden-
tication of key preference parameters under alternative parametric and non-parametric assumptions
about the utility function and about the structure of the error. We nd that non-parametric utility
specications are generally not point identied. However, providing a parametric structure for utility
allows to recover the preference structure under an appropriate set of conditions. These identication
results are novel and can be extended to more general discrete choice settings with non-linear index
function specications. Such results are potentially important because they show identication for pref-
erence parameters (such as covariate-dependent risk aversion parameters) that enter the index function
non-linearly while at the same time placing relatively few restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity
in household preferences. Concretely, we show identication results for household varying constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences in the presence of cluster xed eects while imposing only a
conditional median restriction.
We next estimate the model under alternative sets of assumptions using data from rural Orissa and
carry out a set of counterfactual exercises to evaluate the eects of possible changes in some features of
the underlying economic environment. We nd that allowing for the estimation of covariate-dependent
heterogeneity in risk aversion is important, and that risk aversion changes with education levels and
demographic characteristics of the household. Our results also indicate that perceptions about village-
level net ownership is a relatively important predictor of adoption, while counterfactual price reductions
and increased perceived protection of bednets are estimated to have very limited impact on net uptake
rates. This latter nding is consistent with the often documented failure of public health programs that
attempt to increase bednet use through subsidies or social marketing.
A natural next step would be to address some of the current limitations of the model. First, the
model assumes that beliefs are exogenously given, but belief formation is more likely the result of
cognitive processes which should ideally be modeled explicitly and we hope to do this using follow up
data from the same households. A second related limitation is that we take perceptions about village-
level bednet use as exogenous, while such perceptions may be strategically interdependent.27 Third, our
estimation strategy relies on specically collected data on the perceived protective power of bednets.
Such information, albeit relevant, may not suciently represent the complexity of the purchase decision
faced by a poor multi-person household. Finally, it would be of interest to estimate the model using
experimental data to validate the choice of functional form as well as other model specication issues.
27Although note that since in our model it is a non-linear functional of the distribution of (perceived) behaviour that
enters utility, standard social interaction models are not directly applicable.
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27Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For simplicity we assume that the number of households per cluster is equal to 2. Identication
with a larger number of households per cluster merely require stronger conditioning statements.
Consider the conditional probability of net purchase in this case
l(b1;b2;x1;x2;u()) =
exp(g (u();x1)b1 + g (u();x2)b2)
exp(g (u();x1)) + exp(g (u();x2))
Recall that in the non-parametric case, g only depends upon utility though the functions () 
fj()g3
j=1 which are objects of interest in the likelihood. If the model is not identied, then there
exists a function ~  such that l(;) = l

; ~ 

almost everywhere (a.e.). Evaluating the likelihood at
the values (1;0) and (0;1) for (b1;b2) and dividing the two expressions we see that we must have
g (;x1)   g (;x2) = g

~ ;x1

  g

~ ;x2

(17)
so that if the model was linear and the  functions were constants (e.g. g (;x) = xa1 + xb2)
identication would follow from the standard conditions for linear index conditional logit models.
By assumption 4, the distribution of 1 conditional on all the other random variables in the display
above contains at least two points of support. Denote these points by 0
1 and 00
1. Evaluating the right
hand side at each point in turn and taking dierences we deduce that if the model is not identied then
 
0
1   00
1

3(x1) =
 
0
1   00
1
 ~ 3(x1)
This in turn implies that 3 (x1) = ~ 3 (x1). The above argument can be applied for every value in the
support of x1 and we can then conclude that the function 3 () is identied over the relevant support
of x1. Exactly analogous arguments yield identication of 1 () and 2 () . Note that it is the
presence of the xed eect that requires us to condition 1 on x2. Without a xed eect we would not
need to condition on the second household's covariates. Note also that the utility functions themselves
are not identied since we have a system of three linear equations in four unknowns. The preceding
argument demonstrates identication of an innite dimensional parameter within a maximum likelihood
framework. We note that estimation in such a setting is much more complicated and is deferred to
future work (see Chen 2004 for a discussion of sieve based procedures in such models).
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. From the previous arguments we know that the functions () are non-parametrically identied.
We rst use this result to prove that the parameter vector  is identied and then show that the
parameters n2 are identied as well. Substituting the parametric utility specication (7) into 3()
we have that if the model is not identied then there must exist (~ ; ~ ) such that
(0+1)

c(1;h)
1 
(xa;h;)   c(1;m)
1 
(xa;m;)

= (~ 0+~ 1)

c(1;h)
1 
(xa;h;~ )   c(1;m)
1 
(xa;m;~ )

:
Next, by Assumption (8) we can dierentiate both sides with respect to c(1;m) to obtain
(0 + 1)(1   
 (xa;m;))c(1;m)
 
(xa;m;) = (~ 0 + ~ 1)(1   
 (xa;m; ~ ))c(1;m)
 
(xa;m;~ ) ;
and collecting terms again
c(1;m)

(xa;m;~ ) 
(xa;m;) =
(~ 0 + ~ 1)(1   
 (xa;m; ~ ))
(0 + 1)(1   
 (xa;m;))
28which is possible since by assumption 
 2 (0;1) and (0 + 1) and (~ 0 + ~ 1) are non-zero. By the
continuity of support, we can take derivatives with respect to c(1;m) again to obtain
(
 (xa;m; ~ )   
 (xa;m;))c(1;m)

(xa;m;~ ) 
(xa;m;) 1 = 0
which must hold a.e.. Assuming consumption is positive in every state of the world, we must have

 (xa;m; ~ ) = 
 (xa;m;), and given the logit parametrization of 
 in (8), if xa has a non-singular
second moment matrix, then the equality above will only hold when  = ~ . Therefore,  is identied.
We now show that certain elements of  are identied. The parameter 2 is not identied since it
is an intercept term in the equation. Relaxing the xed eect assumption will permit this parameter to
be identied as well. The remaining parameters are identied. Recall that the function g is dened as
g(x;;) = 0
3xb + (0 + 1)h1(;;c;xa;)   0h0(;c;xa;):
Since  is identied the objects h0(x;);h1(x;) are also identied. Therefore g is now linear in the
remaining unknown parameters. If these parameters are not identied, then there exists a ~  such that
g (x;;1)   g (x2;;) = g (x1; ~ ;)   g (x2; ~ ;) (18)
or rewriting,
0
3(x1b   x2b) + (0 + 1)(h1(x1;)   h1(x2;))   0(h0(x1)   h0(x2;)) =
~ 0
3(x1b   x2b) + (~ 0 + ~ 1)(h1(x1;)   h1(x2;))   ~ 0(h0(x1)   h0(x2;))
But by assumption (8) this can only happen if (0;1+0;0
3) is equal to (~ 0; ~ 1+~ 0; ~ 0
3) We therefore
conclude that the vector (0;1;0
3) is identied.
Remark 1. The identication argument above is non-parametric in the form of 
 () in the sense that
even without the logit parametrization we have shown that ~ 
 (xa;m) = 
 (xa;m).
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The conditional median zero assumption implies that the conditional median of b is equal to an
indicator function
median(bjx) = Ifg(1   2;x)  0g
Following the analogy principle then one could estimate the parameters by minimizing the sample
version of
Ejb   Ifg(1   2;x)  0gj:
Conditions for identication then reduce to showing that if
Ifg(1   2;x)  0g = Ifg(~ 1   ~ 2;x)  0g (19)
with probability one conditional on x, then 1   2 = ~ 1   ~ 2. We will show the negation of this
statement, namely that if two candidate parameter values are not equal then with positive probability
the two indicator functions associated with them are also not equal.
Fix an alternative parameter value   1  2 6= ~   ~ 1   ~ 2 and dene the sets over which the
associated indicator functions disagree
S1

~ 

=
n
x : g (;x)  0 > g

~ ;x
o
29S2

~ 

=
n
x : g

~ ;x

 0 > g (;x)
o
We show that under the assumptions in the lemma, P(S1 [ S2) > 0. First, redene the sets as
S1 (a;t) =
n
x : g (;x)   g

~ ;x

> g (;x)  0
o
S2 (a;t) =
n
x : g (;x)   g

~ ;x

 g (;x) < 0
o
:
By assumption, the distribution of g (;x) =  (1   2) +  conditional upon (xn) has density in a
neighborhood of zero. This ensures that one of the sets above will always have positive probability.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. By Assumption 2 we know that
median(bjx) = Ifg(x;;)  0g
so that identication is equivalent to showing that
(;) 6= (a;t) ) Ifg(x;;)  0g 6= Ifg(x;a;t)  0g;
where the last inequality is interpreted as holding with positive probability. Next, dene the sets over
which the associated indicator functions disagree
S1(a,t) = fx : g (x;;)  0 > g(x;a;t)g
S2 (a,t) = fx : g (x;a;t)  0 > g (x;;)g
We will show that under the assumptions in the lemma, P(S1 [ S2) > 0. First, redene the sets as
S1 (a,t) = fx : g (x;;)   g (x;a,t) > g (x;;)  0g
S2 (a,t) = fx : g (x;;)   g (x;a;t)  g(x;;) < 0g
In order to facilitate analysis of these sets we rewrite the median as
Ifg(x;;)  0g = Ifc(0;m)   s(;;xnc(0;m))  0g
where
s(;;xnc(0;m)) =

1


1h1 (xa;c(1;h);c(1;m);)   (1   )c(0;h)1 
(xa;h;) + 3xb
 1
1 
(xa;m;)
:
Then we can rewrite the sets as
S1(a,t) = fx : s(;;xnc(0;m))   s(a;t;xnc(0;m))  c(0;m)   s(;;xnc(0;m)) > 0g
S2 (a,t) = fx : s(;;xnc(0;m))   s(a,t;xnc(0;m))  c(0;m)   s(;;xnc(0;m)) < 0g:
By assumption, the distribution of c(0;m) conditional on xnc(0;m) has support in a neighborhood of
zero so that one of these sets will always have positive probability as long as
s(;;xnc(0;m)) 6= s(a;t;xnc(0;m)): (20)
30We next show that under the stated assumptions (20) holds with positive probability. First, assume the
statement is not true so that there does exist an (a;t) such that two functions coincide with probability
one. Then, we must have
 
 1 1
1 
(xa;m;)  1
1 
(xa;m;t) =
 
1h1 (;xa;c(1;h);c(1;m))   (1   )c(0;h)1 
(xa;h;) + 3xb

 
a1h1 (t;xa;c(1;h);c(1;m))   (1   )c(0;h)1 
(xa;h;t) + a3xb

and dening
~ s(;;xnc(0;m)) 

1h1 (;xa;c(1;h);c(1;m))   (1   )c(0;h)1 
(xa;h;) + 3xb

and
e(;;xa;t;) 
 
 1 1
1 
(xa;m;)  1
1 
(xa;m;t)
we obtain
e(;;xa;t;) ~ s(a;t;xnc(0;m)) = ~ s(;;xnc(0;m))
By assumption, there exists a variable in ~ s() that does not exist in h() that is continuously distributed
over an interval conditional upon xnc(1;m), namely the variable c(0;h). This justies taking derivatives
with respect to this variable on both sides of the equality above and we obtain (suppressing dependence
upon other covariates)
e(1   
(h;))c(0;h) 
(h;) = (1   
(h;t))c(0;h) 
(h;t)
and collecting terms we obtain
c(0;h)
(h;t) 
(h;) =
(1   
(h;t))
(1   
(h;))
e;
where the right hand side is well dened since the denominator is never equal to zero and as long as
 6= 0 with positive probability (note we can always restrict attention to the set over which  is positive
and condition all subsequent arguments on  belonging to this set). Taking derivatives once again we
obtain
c(0;h)
(h;t) 
(h;) 1 (
(h;t)   
(h;)) = 0 a:e:
By assumption, consumption is almost everywhere positive so we must have 
(h;t) = 
(h;). Since
by assumption the second moment matrix of xa is assumed non-singular, we must therefore have t = 
so that  is identied. Once  is identied then as long as the vector (h1;xb) has non-singular second
moment matrix,  will also be identied.
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Under Assumption 3, it is straightforward to show that the following condition hold for house-
holds 1 and 2 in a cluster (see e.g. Manski 1987),
median(b1   b2jw;b1 6= b2) = sign[g (x1;;)   g (x2;;)]:
Identication requires then that for any candidate pair (a;t)
(a;t) 6= (;) ) sign[g (x1;;)   g (x2;;)] 6= sign[g (x1;;)   g (x2;;)]
31In order to study this further, consider the sets (on the support of w = (x1;x2)) where these functions
disagree
S1(a;t) = fw : g (x1;;)   g (x2;;)  0;g (x1;a;t)   g (x2;a;t) < 0g
S2(a;t) = fw : g (x1;;)   g (x2;;) < 0;g (x1;a;t)   g (x2;a;t)  0g:
We show that at least one of these sets always occurs with positive probability for any choice of (a;t)
so that the model is point identied. First, the index function for household s when the normalization
imposed in Lemma 5 hold can be written as
g (xs;;)  x0
s;b3   4s   x0
s;m5 + 6(s   s) + (1 + 1)hs;1()   hs;0()
=  x0
s  + (1 + 1)h1;s ()   h0;s ();
where the subscript s re
ects the dependence of the h() functions upon the data, and we have for
convenience rewritten the linear part of the index as
 x0
s   x0
s;b3   4s   x0
s;m5 + 6(s   s):
Using this redenition of the index we obtain
g (x1;a;t)   g (x2;a;t)
=
 
 x0
1    x0
2

 a + (1 + a1)(h1;1 (t)   h2;1 (t))   (h1;0 (t)   h2;0 (t))
=  x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 (t)   (h1;0 (t)   h2;0 (t))
=  x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 (t)  
h
h1;0(t)   (1   2)c2(0;h)1 
(h2;t)   2c2(0;m)1 
(m2;t)
i
;
Consider now the inequality
g (x1;a;t)   g (x2;a;t) < 0 (21)
which can be rewritten as
c2 (0;m) <

 
1
2

 x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 (t)   h1;0 (t) + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(h2;t)
 1
1 
(m2;t)
;
and recall that we dene
s(a;t;xnc2 (0;m)) 

 
1
2

 x0 a + a1h1 (t)   h1;0(t) + (1   2)c2(0;h)1 
(h2;t)
 1
1 
(m2;t)
;
so that, suppressing the dependence of s(:) on (xnc2(0;m)) for brevity, we can rewrite the inequality as
2c2 (0;m)
1 
(m2;) < 2s(a;t)1 
(m2;);
and subtracting 2s(;)1 
(m2;) on both sides we obtain
2c2 (0;m)
1 
(m2;)   2s(;)1 
(m2;) < 2s(a;t)1 
(m2;)   2s(;)1 
(m2;)
which is equivalent to
g (x1;;)   g (x2;;) < 2s(a;t)1 
(m2;)   2s(;)1 
(m2;):
Consider the case where the term on the right hand side of the inequality is positive (if it is negative,
one works instead with the reverse inequality from that in (21) and focusses on the set S2). Then we
can write
S1(a;t) =
n
x :0  g (x1;;)   g (x2;;) < 2s(a;t)1 
(m2;)   2s(;)1 
(m2;)
o
:
32By assumption, the distribution of g (x1;;)   g (x2;;) conditional on xnc2 (0;m) has support in
a neighborhood of zero so to complete the proof we have to show that
s(a;t) 6= s(;) (22)
holds with positive probability (note we are assuming 2 > 0 and the argument can be viewed as being
restricted to the set where this is true). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that (22) does not
hold so that s(a;t) = s(;). This equality can be rewritten as


 x0  + (1 + 1)h1 ()   h1;0 () + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(h2;)
 1
1 
(m2;)
=

 x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 (t)   h1;0 (t) + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(h2;t)
 1
1 
(m2;t) ;
where
 =

 
1
2
 1
1 
(m2;)  1
1 
(m2;t)
:
Next, by assumption the distribution of c2(0;h) conditional on wnfc2(0;m);c2(0;h)g is continuously
distributed over some range so that we can take derivatives with respect to c2 (0;h) in that range and
rearrange to obtain

1   
(h2;)
1   
(h2;t)

1   
(m2;t)
1   
(m2;)

 x0 a + (1 + a1)h1(t)   h1;0(t) + (1   2)c2(0;h)1 
(h2;t)

=

 x0  + (1 + a1)h1()   h1;0() + (1   2)c2(0;h)1 
(h2;)

c2(0;h)
(h2;) 
(h2;t):
Finally, by assumption the distribution of c1(0;m) conditional on wnfc2 (0;m);c1(0;m)g is continuously
distributed over some range so that taking derivatives with respect to c1 (0;m) and rearranging:

1   
(h2;)
1   
(h2;t)

1   
(m2;t)
1   
(m2;)

1   
(m1;t)
1   
(m1;)

= c2 (0;h)
(
(h2;) 
(h2;t)) c1 (0;m)
(
(m1;t) 
(m1;)) ;
and taking derivatives with respect to c1 (0;m) again we obtain the result that if the model is not
identied then we must have
c2 (0;h)
(
(h2;) 
(h2;t)) c1 (0;m)
(
(m1;t) 
(m1;) 1) (
(m1;t)   
(m1;)) = 0
almost everywhere. Since by assumption consumption is strictly positive, this must imply 
(m1;t)  

(m1;) = 0 almost everywhere. However, since by assumption the vector xa has a non-singular second
moment matrix, we must have t = . If that is the case, then we must have

 x0  + (1 + 1)h1 ()   h1;0 () + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(h2;)

=

 x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 ()   h1;0 () + (1   2)c2 (0;h)
1 
(h2;)

which simplies to
 
 x0  + (1 + 1)h1 ()

=
 
 x0 a + (1 + a1)h1 ():

By assumption the second moment matrix of ( x;h1 ()) is non-singular and therefore we must have
 = a and so (;t) = (a;t): This is a contradiction since we started by assuming (;t) 6= (a;t).
Therefore the parameters (1;0
3;4;0
5;6;0) are identied.
33Appendix B
Measurement Errors in Beliefs
The model for measurement error for which the maximum score assumption is robust is non-standard
since it is not the traditional classical errors-in-variable model. In fact, identication results for max-
imum score type models with classical measurement error are not known. The type of measurement
error to which the maximum score is robust is one in which the measurement error is best thought of as
being a forecast error given current information (see Imbens and Hyslop 2000) . In this case, assump-
tions on the symmetry of the error distribution given the realized value of the mismeasured variable are
easier to maintain since it is reasonable to assume that the forecast error is unrelated to the reported
(mismeasured) value.
Consider the model given by (5) and suppose that the true probabilities used for decision making
by the household are given by (;). However, at the time of the survey respondents rather than
reporting these quantities report their best guess for these quantities given their current information.
Such errors are plausible if the respondent has forgotten the true values (or the information set used
to generate them) and reports values that are best guesses based on the current information possessed.
In both instances, since reports are \optimal" in some sense (e.g. they are based on minimizing some
loss function). The dierence between the reported and true values is then best thought of as a type of
forecast error. Depending upon the precise loss function used, there will be restrictions on the depen-
dence between the forecast errors and the optimal responses. For instance, if responses are best guesses
based on minimizing an L1 distance, then the resulting forecast error will be median independent of the
reported belief. We assume a somewhat stronger condition: namely that the error has a distribution
that is symmetric around zero conditional on the reported belief (as well as other covariates). Formally,
the measurement error     is assumed to have a distribution symmetric around zero conditional
on x (note that x includes ). We impose a similar assumption on  which is dened analogously
to . If we further assume that, conditional on x each element in the vector of errors (;;) is
symmetrically distributed around zero and all three random variables are independent of each other,
then we obtain the maximum score model with non-parametric utility. Formally, the purchase decision
is given by
b = If
1 + (1   )2 + 3 +   0g
= If1 + (1   )2 + 3 +~   0g
where
~  = (1   2) + 3 +  (23)
By the assumption of conditional symmetry for each of the component random variables we have
median(~ jx) = 0
Random Coecients
Consider the parametric model (6). However, suppose that the coecients  are no longer xed
(unknown) constants but suppose that it is the random quantities  that belong in the equation
34instead of . Further, assume that  =  +  where the vector of errors  are independent of . In
addition, assume that the elements of (;) are independently and symmetrically distributed around
zero conditional on x. Then, the composite error term will satisfy the conditional median restriction
(2). Formally,
~ b = If
3xb + (
0 + 
1)h1   
0h0 +   0g
and given 
j = j + j we can rewrite this as
~ b = If3xb + (0 + 1)h1   0h0 +~   0g
where
~  = 0 (h1   h0) + 1h1 + 3xb
and by the assumption of conditional symmetry we can conclude that median(~ jx) = 0
35 
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Figure 1: Histograms of subjective beliefs about the protective power of bednets.
36Table 1: Summary Statistics
No. of villages 150
No. of households 1947
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.19
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.37
Other Backward Castes (OBC) 0.37
Christian1 0.02
Mean s.d.
Household size 5.46 2.15
# children under 5 in household 0.5 0.7
Highest schooling level in household (years) 8.39 3.72
log(monthly expenditure per head): Itemized2 6.32 0.56
Monthly expenditure per head (Rs): Itemized2 655 443
No. bednets per head 0.29 0.29
No. ITNs per head 0.04 0.15
Slept under a net last night 0.13 0.29
Slept under an ITN last night 0.03 0.14
Sleeps under a net when mosquitoes peak 0.56 0.45
At least one member had malaria last six months3 0.55 0.50
Biomarkers obs.
Malaria 0.12 2621
Moderate anemia (< 10 g/dl) - Males 0.23 965
Moderate anemia (< 10 g/dl) - Females 0.35 1718
Notes:
1Almost all non-Christian households are Hindu.
2Estimated by adding reports on expenditure in the month (or
year, for some items) before the interview.
3Calculated from self-reports. All means are calculated using sampling weights.
Table 2: Beliefs about Malaria Risk
Mean s.d.
No net (U6) 9.3 1.59
No net (adult) 9.0 1.83
No net (PW) 9.2 1.73
Untreated net (U6) 4.9 2.06
Untreated net (adult) 4.6 2.07
Untreated net (PW) 4.8 2.04
ITN (U6) 0.7 1.47
ITN (adult) 0.6 1.47
ITN (PW) 0.7 1.49
Notes: Figures refer to subjective probabilities that an adult, a child under the age of six or a pregnant woman
will contract malaria in the next year, conditional on making regular use of an ITN, of an untreated net or of no
net at all.
37Table 3: Summary Statistics: Malaria Economic Burden
All No Net Nets in hh
in hh. > 0
Any malaria episode reported in last six months 0.52 0.50 0.53
Any positive malaria blood test 0.15 0.16 0.15
Mean Median s.d.
Expected cost of a malaria episode for a working man (Rs) 2791 2300 2175
Expected cost of a malaria episode for a working woman (Rs) 1897 1550 2009
Expected cost of a malaria episode for a non-working member (Rs) 1829 1430 1801
38Table 4: Monte Carlo Simulations: Parametric Utility and Parametric Errors
Mean Median SD IQR
N = 150
0 0.0462 0.0022 0.7357 0.0331
1 -0.5737 -0.5683 0.2166 0.2861
0 0.9719 0.9599 0.2206 0.2829
1 -0.0014 0.0005 0.0107 0.0086
3 3.0157 3.0129 0.1386 0.1853
4 1.0065 1.0057 0.1082 0.1490
5 1.0866 1.1165 0.8568 1.3036
6 -1.0292 -1.0131 0.2026 0.2768
N = 200
0 0.0034 -0.0009 0.0664 0.0251
1 -0.5614 -0.5489 0.2315 0.2439
0 0.9819 0.9794 0.2007 0.2511
1 -0.0009 0.0005 0.0122 0.0061
3 3.0180 3.0207 0.1205 0.1542
4 1.0002 0.9948 0.0988 0.1177
5 0.9868 0.9749 0.6852 0.9021
6 -1.0088 -0.9988 0.1802 0.2461
N = 300
0 0.0009 0.0002 0.0183 0.0207
1 -0.5241 -0.5222 0.1615 0.1941
0 0.9943 0.9919 0.1572 0.2049
1 -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0059 0.0049
3 3.0075 3.0136 0.0910 0.1225
4 0.9995 0.9962 0.0788 0.1090
5 1.0426 1.0269 0.5915 0.8569
6 -1.0027 -1.0041 0.1498 0.1933
N = 600
0 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0105 0.0129
1 -0.5186 -0.5191 0.1005 0.1173
0 0.9891 0.9907 0.1115 0.1431
1 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0036 0.0036
3 3.0044 3.0023 0.0678 0.0925
4 0.9968 0.9989 0.0549 0.0773
5 1.0591 1.0443 0.4496 0.6268
6 -1.0113 -1.0041 0.0941 0.1289
Notes: Each model was simulated 150 times. The true parameter vector is given by (0; :5;1;0;3;1;1; 1).
39Table 5: Monte Carlo Simulations: Parametric Utility with Semi-Parametric Error Specication
Mean Median SD IQR
N = 150
0 0.0758 0.0434 0.1319 0.0904
1 -0.2666 -0.2032 1.2645 1.6102
1 -0.0490 -0.0310 0.0541 0.0664
3 2.6338 2.5680 1.3764 1.8634
4 1.5467 1.4942 0.5638 0.7459
5 1.5630 1.5687 1.2835 1.7698
6 -1.7357 -1.5662 0.8569 1.0985
N = 200
0 0.0637 0.0437 0.0686 0.0754
1 -0.4868 -0.4174 1.1876 1.4414
1 -0.0454 -0.0317 0.0434 0.0587
3 2.8497 2.8045 1.3320 1.7056
4 1.5828 1.5520 0.5400 0.7047
5 1.8392 1.7481 1.1787 1.6210
6 -1.8209 -1.6700 0.7855 0.9344
N = 300
0 0.0590 0.0422 0.0586 0.0678
1 -0.4828 -0.4614 1.0835 1.3860
1 -0.0423 -0.0332 0.0383 0.0525
3 3.1150 3.0830 1.3318 1.6539
4 1.5673 1.5441 0.4655 0.6444
5 1.7838 1.7337 1.1888 1.4665
6 -1.8205 -1.6560 0.7787 0.9292
N = 600
0 0.0492 0.0378 0.0442 0.0538
1 -0.4785 -0.4669 0.7939 1.0353
1 -0.0363 -0.0293 0.0313 0.0421
3 3.5461 3.5462 1.1171 1.5641
4 1.6296 1.6147 0.3847 0.5450
5 1.9149 1.8305 1.0816 1.4428
6 -1.8381 -1.7826 0.6835 0.7732
Notes: Each model was simulated 150 times. The true parameter vector is given by (0; :5;0;3;1;1; 1).
40Table 6: Parametric Utility with Parametric Errors
Variable Point Estimate Std.Dev T-Stat
CRRA function parameters ()
HH Size 0.1187 0.5518 0.21
H. Head Education 1.8980 0.4729 4.01
U5 0.9186 0.4892 1.87
H. Head Age 1.7950 0.6278 2.86
Malaria Status 0.4569 0.4582 1.00
Parameters entering Linearly ()
PurchaseConsumption (1) -0.7194 0.6691 -1.07
PurchaseCommunity Eects (3) 0.7095 0.1354 5.24
Malaria Status (4) -0.3468 0.4384 -0.79
MalariaHH Size (51) -0.0588 0.0312 -1.88
MalariaU5 (52) -0.1954 0.1068 -1.82
PurchaseMalaria (6) 0.4658 0.3701 1.25
Notes: Estimated on a cluster of 129 villages with 1865 total households. Maximization was carried out using a
gradient based algorithm and standard errors were computed by bootstrapping clusters with 250 replications.
Table 7: Counterfactual Exercises: Parametric Errors
Exogenous Shift Point Estimate 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile
Price of Nets Falls by 50%
Average change in index .002 .001 .0035
% change in index (/100) .24 .01 .69
Upper bound on households \switching" 4 1 9
Beliefs in net ecacy increase by 50%
Average change in index .03 .0314 .0351
% change in index .10 .002 .33
Upper bound on households \switching" 23 15 32
Beliefs of Community ownership increase by 50%
Average change in index .38 .35 .41
% change in index .89 .62 .91
Upper bound on households \switching" 90 83 114
Notes: Standard errors were computed by bootstrapping clusters using 250 replications. The Average change in
index is the sample average of the change in the estimated index g(^ ; ^ ) associated with the indicated exogenous
shift.
41Table 8: Parametric Utility with Semi-Parametric Error Specication
Variable Point Estimate 2.5 Percentile 97.5 percentile
CRRA function parameters ()
HH Size -1.54 -2.76 3.76
H. Head Education -2.14 -4.63 0.43
U5 0.95 -2.68 4.54
H. Head Age -0.30 -1.45 0.19
Malaria Status 1.53 0.57 3.67
Parameters entering Linearly ()
PurchaseCommunity Eects (3) 2.53 0.63 4.57
Malaria Status (4) -1.91 -5.10 -0.18
MalariaHH Size (51) 0.02 -0.41 0.25
MalariaU5 (52) -0.22 -1.82 -0.09
PurchaseMalaria (6) 1.76 -0.01 6.65
Notes: Estimated on a cluster of 129 villages with 1865 total households. Maximization was carried out using a
genetic algorithm and standard errors were computed using subsampling with subsample size set to 103 and 250
replications.
Table 9: Counterfactual Exercises: Maximum Score
Exogenous Shift Point Estimate 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile
Price of Nets Falls by 50% 24 1 62
Beliefs in net ecacy increase by 50% 2 0 10
Beliefs of Community ownership increase by 50% 18 2 58
Notes: The gures are estimates of the upper bound of the number of households switching to purchase as a
consequence of the exogenous shift. Counterfactuals computed using parametric utility and parameter estimates
from the semi-parametric error specication. Standard errors were computed using subsampling at the cluster
level with subsample size set to 103 and using 250 replications.
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